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The Value of Formal Planning for Strategic Decisions: Review of Empirical Research 
 
J. Scott Armstrong 
Strategic Management Journal, 3 (1982), 197-211 
Reprinted with permission from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
A review of research from organizational behavior supported the guidelines by corporate planners: 
that is, use an explicit approach for setting objectives, generating strategies, evaluating strategies, 
monitoring results, and obtaining commitment. To determine whether these findings could be 
applied to strategic decision making in organizations, a review was made of all published field 
research on the evaluation of formal planning. Formal planning was superior in 10 of the 15 
comparisons drawn from 12 studies, while informal planning was superior in only two 
comparisons. Although this research did not provide sufficient information on the use of various 
aspects of the planning process, mild support was provided for having participation by 
stakeholders. Formal planning tended to be more useful where large changes were involved, but, 
beyond that, little information was available to suggest when formal planning is most valuable. 
Future research should assess the formal planning process, the situation in which it is used, and its 
effects on the total system. 
 
 
Formal planning seems valuable-for strategic decision making because so much money is spent on it. Some 
of the companies that use formal planning believe that it improves profits and growth. In AI-Bazzaz and Grinyer 
(1980), 48 per cent of the companies reported such a benefit. But some companies do not agree. Furthermore, 
researchers have obtained conflicting findings; some claim planning is useful, while others claim the opposite. 
This paper provides a systematic examination of published empirical evidence to answer three questions: 
• Is formal planning useful for strategic decision making?  
• Which aspects of the planning process are most useful?  
• In what situations is planning most useful? 
First, this paper proposes a framework for the evaluation of planning; this section draws upon research 
from organizational behavior. Next, it reviews field research on the value of formal strategic planning in 
organizations. Finally, it presents suggestions for further research. 
 
A Framework For Evaluation 
The basic framework for evaluation is a simple one, used in many scientific evaluations: 
(a) What is the treatment? 
(b) Under what conditions was the treatment used? 
(c) What were the results? 
This section first examines these three questions in the context of planning, then discusses each in more detail. 
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The treatment refers to the “planning process”. A definition is needed to distinguish formal from informal 
planning. This definition should be detailed enough so that the planning process could be replicated by others. 
The conditions refer to the `situation' in which planning is used. External (environmental) and internal 
(organizational) factors should be described in detail. 
The “results” refer to the effects of the planning process on the total system. This includes the intended as 
well as the unintended outcomes. It includes financial as well as non-financial results, and long-term as well as 
short-term results. It includes everyone affected by the organization. 
 
The Formal Planning Process 
Much research exists on the usefulness of various aspects of formal planning. This research, from 
organizational behavior, is relatively recent; much of it has appeared since 1970. It is used here to provide a 
description of an effective planning process. In general, this research has supported the advice provided in 
publications describing how to conduct the corporate planning process (e.g., Ansoff, 1965; Stainer, 1969). 
 Formal strategic planning calls for an explicit process for determining the firm's long-range objectives, 
procedures for generating and evaluating alternative strategies, and a system for monitoring the results of the plan 
when implemented. During each of these steps, it is important that a systematic procedure be used to gain 
commitment of those who will be affected by the plan. These steps are summarized in Figure 1 and are discussed 
below. (A more extensive description of each of these steps is provided in Armstrong, 1982). 
 
Figure 1. Formal strategic planning process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Specify Objectives 
The specification of objectives (goals) has long been regarded as a major aspect of formal planning. The 
objectives should be written clearly. They should start with the ultimate objectives for the organization, then should 
be translated into specific measurable objectives. In addition, the objectives should be challenging. 
Substantial evidence exists on the value of setting objectives. Reviews of this research are provided by 
Latham and Yukl (1975). Tolchinsky and King (1980), and Locke et al. (1981). Most of the research consists of 
laboratory studies. Some studies, however, have taken place in firms. For example, Kim and Hamner (1976) found 
that explicit objectives improved performance for service jobs at Bell Telephone; Ivancevich (1977) found that 
specific objectives for skilled technicians in an equipment and parts manufacturing company proved to be superior 
to instructions to “do your best;” and, in the only experimental industrial study, Latham and Kinne (1974) found that 
explicit objectives improved productivity and reduced absenteeism in 20 pulpwood logging operations. 
In addition to improvements in performance, explicit objectives have led to greater satisfaction among 
participants in organizations (Arvey et al., 1976; Ivancevich, 1977; Katerberg, 1980). 
Seek commitment 
Specify 
objectives 
Generate 
strategies 
Evaluate 
strategies 
Monitor 
results 
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Strategic planning calls for an examination of the complete system. Consequently, many objectives are 
involved. “Stakeholder” analysis can help to ensure that all of the important objectives are included. This analysis 
calls first for a listing of all groups that contribute to the organization. For most firms, this would include creditors, 
stockholders, employees, consumers, suppliers, dealers, and the local community. The planners should then identify 
explicit objectives for each group (e.g., return on investment for stockholders; stability, good wages, and good 
working conditions for employees; reliable and safe products for consumers; adequate return on investment for 
retailers; and low pollution for the local community). 
 
 
Generate Strategies 
 
Formal planning calls for the generation of alternative strategies. These strategies should be written in 
enough detail to allow for an explicit evaluation (the next step). Evidence from studies in organizational behavior 
suggests that the generation of the strategies should be completed before any evaluation begins (see, e.g. Maier, 
1963). 
 
Two guidelines are typically recommended for the development of strategies. First, an attempt should be 
made to provide comprehensive strategies; that is, the plan should consider all important factors. Numerous books 
and articles have provided checklists and flow charts to help ensure that comprehensive plans can be developed 
(e.g., Ansoff, 1965). The second guideline is that the plan contain slack resources; that is, extra time, mo ney, and 
facilities should be held in reserve. This recognizes uncertainty and adds flexibility to the plan. 
 
Alternative strategies can improve the adaptability of the organization in two ways. First, by explicitly 
examining alternatives, it is likely that the organization will find alternatives that are superior to the current 
procedure. Second, the organization may encounter environmental changes; if alternative (contingency) plans have 
been prepared for these changes, the organization can react in a systematic way. 
 
The generation of alternative strategies has been widely recommended as good practice in planning. The 
literature describes complex techniques for generating strategies. For example, numerous sophisticated techniques 
have been proposed as aids in the selection of marketing strategies. Although organizations seem satisfied with these 
procedures (Coe, 1981), 1 have been unable to find empirical evaluations of their usefulness. Many basic questions 
remain unanswered. How many strategies should be generated for a given environment? When is it practical to 
prepare contingency plans to deal with alternative environments? Should the strategies be generated by those who 
will eventually be responsible for the implementation of a strategy? 
 
Research has, however, identified better procedures for generating strategies. For example, synectics and 
brainstorming are clearly superior to the traditional (unstructured) group meeting for improving both the quantity 
and quality of ideas (Bouchard, 1972). 
 
 
Evaluate Alternative Strategies 
 
Formal planning calls for a systematic procedure for evaluating the various alternatives. First the 
alternatives must be screened to ensure that they do not violate any constraints. The feasible strategies should then 
be rated against each of the listed objectives. Various procedures can be used here, such as checklists, the Delphi 
technique (with internal experts), or the “devil's advocate” (where one person is given the role to challenge a 
proposed strategy). Traditional meetings, as commonly used in informal planning, are seldom adequate. 
 
Unfortunately, little research is available. One exception is the research on the “devil's advocate.” Cosier 
(1978) presented subjects with two plans for a simulated environment; subjects using the devil's advocate procedure 
were more likely to select the most appropriate plan in this simulation. 
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Monitor Results 
 
The plan should provide for explicit feedback at given intervals. To allow for corrective action, the 
following should be monitored: 
 
(1) changes in the environment, 
 
(2) changes in the organization's capabilities and in the capabilities of its competitors (strengths 
and weaknesses), 
 
(3) actions taken by the organization, 
 
(4) actions taken by competitors, and 
 
(5) results.  
 
The monitoring of results should relate to the objectives for each stakeholder. This comparison between 
results and objectives can provide a basis for action. The monitoring system should have explicit performance 
standards so that the firm can determine whether the strategies are achieving the desired results. 
 
The value of feedback has been well established in laboratory studies (see reviews by Tolchinsky and King, 
1980; Locke, Cartledge and Koeppel, 1968) and in organizational studies (see review by Ilgen, Fisher and Taylor, 
1979, and the study by Wexley and Nemeroff, 1975). Some studies found that feedback is useful only if it relates to 
goals (e.g., Erez, 1977, in a laboratory study, and Becker, 1978, in a field study to reduce residential energy usage). 
Others found that feedback had an independent effect, perhaps because some goals are intrinsically obvious (e.g., 
Nemeroff and Cosentino, 1979, and Seligman and Darley, 1977). Certainly., however, feedback is more useful if it 
relates to prespecified goals (Kim and Hamner, 1976; Locke et al., 1981). 
 
The monitoring system is expected to. have a greater impact if it is tied into the organization's incentive 
system. This helps the organization maintain commitment to the goals represented by the strategic plan. This does 
not always occur; organizations sometimes focus solely on the stockholders or on the personal goals of the 
managers. Also; they seem to stress short-range goals at the expense of the long-range goals. 
 
Apparently, not many firms have a systematic procedure for monitoring the success of their strategic plans. 
Horovitz (1979), in a survey of the planning practices of 52 large firms in Great Britain, France and West Germany, 
found that virtually none had an explicit procedure for monitoring results of their long-range plans. Typically, they 
relied on short-range budget controls. 
 
 
Seek Commitment 
 
It is not sufficient to develop plans. Plans are frequently ignored. Other times they are used to rationalize a 
course of action previously decided. Formal planning calls for an explicit procedure for gaining commitment to the 
plan. This implies, for example, a need for meetings; Al-Bazzaz and Grinyer (1980) found that the perceived 
contribution of planning was higher when the firms had more meetings. Presumably, the need for meetings carries 
through all phases of planning. 
 
Commitment to objectives is expected to be higher if the various stakeholders participate in the objective 
setting process. In other words, “self-set” goals are expected to be superior to goals set by others. This generalization 
is based on laboratory studies (e.g., Bass, 1977; Latham, Mitchell and Dossett, 1978; Latham and Saari, 1979) and 
on field studies (see Blumberg, 1968, for a review, and see Rosenberg and Rosenstein, 1980). On the other hand, 
assigned goals were useful in many situations. For example, assigned goals were accepted by new trainees on a job 
and by workers who were not subject to group norms (see Latham and Yukl's 1976 study of typists, and Ivancevich's 
1977 study of skilled technicians). But where no legitimate basis exists for the assignment of goals, they would be 
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expected to have little impact. For example, in Dossett, Latham and Saari (1980), the assignment of goals improved 
the response rate to a mail, survey only when a goal (time deadline) was assigned by the respondent's supervisor. 
 
Participation in the generation and evaluation of alternative strategies is often helpful in gaining 
commitment for a plan. Perlmutter and Monty (1977) reviewed laboratory experiments showing that if subjects 
believed they had some control over the situation, they performed more effectively. Van de Ven (1980) described 
how participation was used successfully by organizations introducing child care programs. Participation seems 
especially important when the strategies involve large changes. 
 
To maintain commitment to the plan, it is useful to develop a monitoring system that provides relevant and 
accurate feedback. This feedback should be provided in a timely fashion with fixed reporting periods. It should 
inform all key stakeholders so they can see how their interests are affected. 
 
Rather than seeking commitment to the plan, managers sometimes use planning to gain control over others. 
This may help to explain why formal planning is more popular among higher than lower level management. For 
example, in Ang and Chua (1979), 80 per cent of top management reported that they were “very favorable” towards 
(formal) long-range planning; only 30 per cent-of the operating managers were “very favorable.” This is consistent 
with the findings in the survey by Al-Bazzaz and Grinyer (1980) that the most important difficulties related to the 
interface of formal planning with the line departments. Al-Bazzaz and Grinyer (1980) also found that the perceived 
success of planning was higher in companies where the chief planner was in a lower position in the organization. 
This suggests planning might be more successful if formal authority is not invoked. In other words, if planning is 
used to control others, its impact may be detrimental because operating management might feel less responsible for 
the success of strategic decisions. 
 
 
Situations Favoring the Use of Formal Strategic Planning 
 
In what situations would formal strategic planning be expected to be most useful? Little study has been 
done in this area. Based on a review of the organizational behaviour literature and on my own experience, I propose 
four characteristics of the situation to be important: inefficient markets, large changes, high uncertainty, and high 
complexity of the task. My hypotheses are that each of these factors increases the need for formal planning. 
 
In addition to my literature review and experience, I conducted a convenience sample survey of the 
participants at the Strategic Management Society Conference in London in October 1981. I asked participants at one 
session to provide a written response to the question: 
 
Under what conditions is formal planning most useful for strategic decision making? 
 
Of the 24 participants who returned this questionnaire, 21 responded to this question. Of these, only one 
respondent said that formal planning would be useful in `all situations'. Fourteen respondents cited environmental 
change as a big factor; interestingly, 11 of these respondents thought that formal planning was less appropriate when 
change was rapid. Four responses related to complexity, three related to uncertainty, and one to inefficient markets. 
One respondent suggested that management support was an important condition. No other factors were mentioned. 
Clearly, little agreement existed in this group on the conditions under which formal planning is most appropriate. 
My hypotheses are discussed below. 
 
 
Inefficient Markets 
 
If an objective is obvious, little need exists for a formal objective setting process. An efficient market 
makes the objectives more obvious. Little evidence has been found to suggest that an organization can make better 
decisions than a relatively efficient market. An organization in an efficient market can react to meet the demands of 
its employee, financial and consumer stakeholders. 
 
As inefficiencies are introduced, formal planning may become more useful. An inefficient market provides 
little information on the proper pricing strategy. It also raises serious questions on how to allocate rewards among 
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the various stakeholders. Formal planning can examine the pricing issue in a systematic way. It can address the 
allocation of rewards in an explicit and open manner. Thus, planning might be more appropriate for regulated 
industries and non-profit organizations. 
 
Some people argue just the opposite. Formal planning is most useful for profit-oriented firms because those 
with poor planning might not survive. The difference in these two viewpoints arises from the fact that the first puts 
more emphasis on an analysis of the total system. Regulated industries and non-profit organizations can exist 
indefinitely when they use resources inefficiently. Profit-oriented firms get fewer opportunities to misuse resources 
because a more efficient organization could take over. 
 
 
Large Changes 
 
Changes can occur from the outside (the environment) or from the inside (a change in the organization's 
resources). Most organizations are designed to deal with small outside changes and they typically resist inside 
changes. But for large changes, the standard organizational response becomes less relevant. As a result, I 
hypothesize that formal planning is more important where changes are large. 
 
Some evidence exists that formal planning is more relevant where change is large. Lindsay and Rue (1980) 
provided survey results in which firms in more complex and faster changing environments said they were more 
likely to use formal planning, but their study did not examine whether such a procedure led to better performance. 
Evidence that formal planning is most appropriate when change is large was provided by Thune and House (1970); 
they found that planning was more helpful -in markets characterized by a high rate of technological innovation and 
new product introductions. 
 
 
High Uncertainty 
 
If it is clear what will happen and when, the need for planning seems small. As uncertainties increase, the 
organization can benefit by planning to deal with these uncertainties. (Theoretically, with complete uncertainty, 
planning would be of little value.) My hypothesis is that over the practical range for uncertainty, high uncertainty 
would require more planning. I found little prior evidence on this issue, and it is not difficult to find arguments 
against this hypothesis. 
 
 
High Complexity 
 
More complex tasks create a higher need for a plan to ensure that the various bits and pieces fit together. 
Thus, I hypothesize that firms involved with complex production, financial and marketing processes would have a 
greater need for planning. 
 
I found no empirical evidence on this issue. It would appear to be one of the least controversial of the four 
hypotheses; however, one of my survey respondents felt that formal planning was most appropriate for simple 
situations. 
 
 
Interaction among Hypotheses 
 
Given the uncertainty about the various hypotheses, it seems reasonable initially to treat each of the 
hypotheses independently. Planning is hypothesized to be relevant in cases where all four of the preceding 
conditions hold. When one or more of these conditions does not apply, planning. would be expected to be. less 
valuable (or perhaps even be detrimental) to the performance of the organization: 
 
An example of an organization where all four of the conditions apply would be a company building atomic 
reactors in the U.S.A. It has a complex task, large changes are involved, uncertainty is high, and the market is 
inefficient. At the other extreme would be a typical middle-price restaurant operating in a stable neighbourhood in 
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New York City and contemplating no major changes. Formal strategic planning- should be useful for the former but 
not the latter. 
 
Some strategic decisions will create the above conditions. For example, mergers or new .product 
introductions can involve large changes. If the new product involves a patented technological breakthrough, it can 
also lead to an inefficient market (monopoly power) and high complexity. Formal planning is expected to be useful 
in these situations. 
 
Keep in mind that these hypotheses on the relationship of the situation to planning are not drawn from 
significant prior research: Furthermore, there may be other, more important, characteristics of the situation that have 
been overlooked by me and by my convenience sample. 
 
 
Results of Formal Planning 
 
One of the expected benefits of formal planning is that it will avoid sub-optimization. It should lead to 
greater success in light of all of the organization's objectives. Thus, an examination should be made of the impact of 
planning upon each of the stakeholders. The previous discussion on monitoring provided the necessary conditions 
for the evaluation of planning from the viewpoint of the complete system. 
 
 
Field Research on Strategic Planning 
 
The above research from organizational psychology suggests that formal planning should be useful for 
strategic decision making. I also proposed hypotheses on when formal planning would be most useful. But these 
generalizations were drawn mostly from studies of individuals and small groups. Is it possible to generalize to large 
organizations? To assess this, I analyzed all empirical field research that was relevant to the use of formal planning 
for strategic decision making by organizations. 
 
The literature on formal planning began in the early 1950s and it is extensive. Hofer's (1976) 
comprehensive review of research on formal planning produced over 100 references to published and unpublished 
studies. His review was helpful to my study because it identified those studies that did not attempt an evaluation of 
formal planning. In fact, few studies have made such an attempt. 
 
A listing of all published empirical studies on the subject is provided in Table 1. All of these studies 
involved U.S.A. organizations, except for Grinyer and Norburn (1975), who used firms in the U.K., and Harju 
(1981), whose study was done in Finland. All studies used mail surveys to assess the planning process except for 
two: Grinyer and Norburn (1975) used questionnaires plus interviews, while Van de Ven (1980) used 
questionnaires, interviews, observation, and examination of planning reports. All of the studies were 
non-experimental except for Van de Ven (1980) who used a quasi-experimental design (an experiment with no 
random assignment of the treatments). 
 
The published studies were examined to determine whether formal planning has been useful and in what 
situations it has been most useful. To examine this, each of the 15 comparisons in 12 studies was rated to determine: 
 
(a) what aspects of formal planning were actually used, 
(b) in what situations formal planning was used, and 
(c) what were the results of formal (versus informal) planning? 
In addition. to my own ratings for each study, independent assessments were made by Spyros Makridakis 
and Richard Hoffman. Hoffman and I then discussed each rating. If disagreements remained, the item was coded as 
“?”. Little disagreement arose over the assessment of the “results,” some disagreement arose for the “planning 
process,” and much disagreement arose over the `situation'. For the latter, over half the ratings were discussed. 
 
 8
Copies of the consensus ratings, along with a draft of the paper, were then sent to each of the authors in 
Table 1. They were asked to comment on the ratings of their study. Replies were received from authors of all of the 
studies. Most authors agreed with all ratings. In some cases, the authors provided information that was not in their 
papers. This information and the authors' opinions were used to adjust the final ratings. 
 
Early drafts of my paper were also circulated among researchers from November 1980 to November 1981 
to identify any relevant studies that might have been omitted. The studies in Table 1 represent a complete listing of 
the relevant published research. Unpublished research was excluded due- to cost, the impossibility of ensuring that 
these papers would be representative of all unpublished studies, and the fact that it would then become impractical 
for anyone to replicate my study. 
 
The most obvious thing to observe in Table 1 is the number of “?”. The studies did not provide sufficient 
information on the nature of the planning process as 60 per cent of the entries were rated “?”.  In fact, I was unable, 
in most studies, to find any description of the planning process. One study, Leontiades and Tezel (1980), treated this 
lack of definition as an advantage. They asked chief executives to rate the importance of planning, but they did not 
provide the executives with a definition nor did they ask them for a definition. They claimed (p. 68) that, “An 
advantage of our approach . . . is that it eliminated the necessity to make an outside judgment on the quality or 
definition of formal planning.” But without a description of the planning techniques; it is not possible to assess the 
value of planning in a scientific manner. 
 
The lack of information was greater for the “situation,” where 70 per cent of the entries were “?”. Worse 
yet, sufficient information was provided in only one-third of the situations that were coded. 
 
The studies had been selected on the condition that they had assessed results. But 80 per cent of the studies 
limited themselves to an assessment solely of the impact of planning upon the stockholders. 
 
Despite the limitations of the studies in Table 1, a pattern did emerge. In general, formal planning was 
useful: improved performance was noted in 10 of 15 comparisons, with five of these improvements statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level. Three comparisons showed no differences. Only two of the comparisons reported 
negative effects due to formal planning, both from the same study and neither statistically significant (Fulmer and 
Rue, 1974). This 10 to 2 advantage for formal planning is statistically significant at p < 0.05 (ties were excluded). 
Furthermore, formal planning was not superior in the two situations where it was inappropriate (for the two Fulmer 
and Rue comparisons at the bottom of Table 1). 
 
Detailed analysis was difficult due to the small sample size and the missing data. As a result, only tentative 
conclusions are presented below on the importance of various aspects of the planning process and the nature of the 
situation. 
 
 
Planning Process 
 
Objectives were explicitly addressed in all but 2 of the 15 comparisons. Thus, the data do not allow for a 
comparison of written versus implicit objectives. 
 
In contrast to the attention given to explicit objective setting, only three comparisons were known to use an 
explicit approach to the generation of strategies. These same studies used an explicit approach to the evaluation of 
strategies. Formal planning was more successful in each of these three comparisons, significantly so in two. In 
contrast, formal planning was superior in 7 of the other 12 comparisons. Thus, the tendency favours the hypothesis 
but the results are not statistically significant. 
 
Exploit monitoring was included in 6 of the 15 comparisons. Surprisingly, planning success tended to be 
poorer in these studies although the differences were not statistically significant. 
 
Commitment was given explicit attention in four comparisons. In each case, formal planning was superior, 
significantly so in three cases. This compares with successful planning in 6 of the 11 cases having insufficient 
information on commitment. Harju's (1981) study examined commitment in detail and concluded that it was an 
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important factor. Thus, the evidence favored the hypothesis that it is valuable to have a formal process to gain 
commitment; however, the results were not statistically significant. 
 
 
Situational factors 
 
No conclusions could be drawn with respect to `uncertainty' or `complexity' as no explicit measures were 
provided in any of the studies. 
 
Van de. Ven (1980) and Kallman and Shapiro (1978) were the only studies that clearly involved an 
inefficient market. Formal planning was superior in these comparisons. However, Herold, House and Thune (1972) 
seemed to involve an efficient market and planning was successful (though not significantly so). 
 
The area of “change” is the only one allowing for a comparison. Here, planning was successful in all five 
comparisons with large changes. The superiority was significant in three of these studies. Where the amount of 
change was small or unknown, planning was helpful in five of the ten comparisons. These results support the 
hypothesis that planning is most useful where changes are large (p < 0.10). 
 
 
Limitations 
 
A major defect running through all of the studies except Van de Ven (1980), Ansoff et al. (1970) and Harju 
(1981) is that while planning is designed to make the firm more efficient from a total systems viewpoint, the results 
related primarily to stockholders. Generally, only financial results were examined. These improved financial results 
were likely to have extended to groups other than the stockholders, but this issue was not specifically addressed in 
most of the studies. 
Planning might improve the results for the total system (i.e., for the various stakeholders in general) even 
though stockholders do not benefit. For example, in a short-range situation characterized by shortages, it is usually 
assumed that stockholders will benefit as prices for the firm's product increase. In such a case, formal planning for 
the total system might be used to provide more benefits for the local community and less for stockholders than might 
occur under informal planning. Under formal planning, the revenue increases might be used, say, to invest in 
equipment for pollution control, instead of being paid to stockholders. 
 
 
Alternative Explanations 
 
For many of the studies in Table 1, the direction of causality was not clear. Did planning yield higher 
profits, or did firms with. more profits spend more on planning? Many would argue in favor of the latter hypothesis. 
If true, this would help to explain the positive outcome in my assessment of planning. This alternative hypothesis is 
especially serious for five of the last six studies in Table 1 (all except Kallman/Shapiro) because their financial 
criteria covered the period prior to the time when the distinction was made between those that used formal panning 
and those that did not. If anything, one would expect benefits to come well after the introduction of planning. If one 
discards these studies and uses only the first seven comparisons in Table 1, however, the results still favour 
planning: six improved comparisons with one tie, and three of the six improvements were significant at P < 0.05. 
 
Another possible explanation is that the researchers were biased in favour of formal planning and that their 
methodology was not sufficient to overcome this bias. Terpstra's (1981) evaluation of studies in organizational 
behavior suggested that this is often a source of bias inasmuch as studies using poorer methods were more likely to 
yield positive findings. 
 
I rated the studies against Terpstra's (1981) six criteria. These asked whether a study had a: 
 
(1) probability sample, 
(2) sample size greater than 30, 
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(3) control group, 
(4) random selection for treatment, 
(5) pre- and post-test, or 
(6) significance level of p < 0.05 ? 
Each question was rated as a “yes” or “no”, and the “yeses” were totalled. 
 
Terpstra (1981) reported perfect agreement between the two coders used in his ratings of research papers. 
In contrast, I had some difficulty in making the ratings. I tried to be lenient. For example, if the researcher achieved 
a response rate in a survey of more than 70 per cent, I classified it as a probability sample. (The uncertainty over the 
ratings was not so great, however, that it would change the conclusions reported below.) 
 
Overall, the studies rated poorly on Terpstra's (1981) scale. They scored an average of 1.5 against an ideal 
score of 6. This compares poorly, also, with the average of 3.0 for the 52 studies in organizational behavior that 
were examined by Terpstra (1981). These results suggest that the alternative explanation of bias due to poor 
methodology is a likely candidate. 
 
As a further test of the potential bias due to poor methodology, I examined the outcomes for the six studies 
that used the poorest methodology in Table 1 (rated at 0 or 1 on the Terpstra 1981 scale). If this were indeed a 
source of bias, one would predict that these studies should have had more favorable conclusions about formal 
planning than did the six studies using better methodology (rated at 2 or 3).1 The results suggested that poor 
methodology was not a key factor: only three of the six poorer studies had `uniformly positive results' (Terpstra's 
1981 criterion), while all six of the better studies had positive results. These results were not only opposite to the 
bias prediction, they were significant at p < 0.10 using the Fisher Exact Test. 
 
 
Suggestions for Further Research 
 
The literature on formal strategic planning began in a serious way about thirty years ago, although twenty 
years passed before a scientific study assessed the value of formal strategic planning. Evaluations of this sort began 
in 1970; however, they generally have overlooked key factors. A continuation of this research at the current pace 
will require another century before we have sufficient information to assess: 
 
(a) the best way to conduct formal planning, 
(b) in what situations formal planning is most useful, and 
(c) the impact of formal planning on the whole system. 
Progress will occur much more rapidly if the evaluation studies make assessments of the process, the situation, and 
overall results. Field studies of strategic planning would also benefit substantially from improved research methods. 
Important here are the uses of probability samples (Harju, 1981, performed best here), control groups (only Van de 
Ven, 1980, did this), random assignment of the treatment (no studies), and pre- and post-test measurement (done 
only by Van de Ven, 1980, and Ansoff et al., 1970). 
 
From a practical viewpoint, field research is not a simple matter. It is difficult to use control groups with 
random assignment of the planning process. Care is needed in the treatment of confidential information. An 
                                                 
1 These “better” studies included Van de Ven (1980), Ansoff et al. (1970), Thune and House (1970), Harju (1981), 
Karger and Malik (1975), and Wood and LaForge (1979, 1981). A copy of the ratings for each of the studies in 
Table 1 is available from the author. 
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alternative approach, laboratory experimentation, allows for control groups and random assignment. It also 
eliminates the problem of confidentiality. However, it lacks the realism of the field experiment. 
 
Laboratory experiments would be helpful for assessing the various components of the planning process. 
Thus far, little research has been conducted on the generation of alternative strategies or on their evaluation. 
Additional research is also needed on techniques for monitoring and commitment. 
 
In addition to the step-by-step examination of planning techniques, laboratory experiments seem relevant 
for testing the complete planning process. Montanari, Moorhead and Montanari (1980) used such an approach when 
they trained some subjects in planning, then examined their effectiveness on the “Space Tower Exercise”. (In this 
case, planning did not improve effectiveness. It was not clear whether planning should have worked in this situation, 
however. Nor was it shown that the experimental groups actually used the planning principles.) 
 
Nutt (1976, 1977) also used a laboratory experiment. He evaluated different approaches to planning for 
health services agencies. Experts were asked to rate decis ions developed by informal planners as well as by two 
formal approaches to planning. The two approaches were: 
 
(a) a “systems approach”, which included setting objectives and an evaluation of alternative 
strategies, and 
 
(b) a “behavioral approach”, which used structured group participation among stakeholders to 
identify problems, then to solve the problems (but no explicit objective setting or evaluation 
of alternative strategies). 
 
The systems approach was rated highest in quality of the plans, and the behavioral approach produced more 
innovative ideas. Informal planning did poorly in both areas. Nutt's (1976, 1977) papers did not report on the 
implementation of the plans. 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
Research from organizational behavior has been valuable in studying which aspects of planning are useful. 
Particularly useful were explicit objective setting and monitoring results. However, further research is needed to 
identify which aspects of this process are relatively most useful in strategic planning for organizations and which 
aspects can be ignored. 
 
Research on the application of planning to organizations has been consistent with the position that planning 
is useful. Comparisons between organizations that use formal planning versus those using informal planning found 
performance among the formal planners to be superior in ten cases and poorer in only two cases, with three ties. 
These results were significant (p < 0.05) and they seemed important. Serious research problems were found in these 
studies, so few conclusions could be drawn about how to plan and when to plan. However, it did seem important to 
involve key stakeholders in the planning process; and planning seemed most useful in situations involving large 
changes. 
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1 “F” means formal process was used, “I” means informal, and “?” means insufficient information.  The parentheses indicate our assumptions in cases that seemed obvious.  
2 “Y” is yes, “N” is no. (See note 1 for “?” and parentheses). 
3 “F” means that formal planning was superior, “I” means informal, “0” means a tie, and “?” means insufficient information.  The asterisk means that the results were significant at p < 0.05. 
4 The time span refers to the years for which the results were examined.  
5 Kudla (1981) reported a reduction in financial risk due to formal planning, thus this study was coded “+” despite the lack of effects in Kudla (1980). 
6 Additional information was obtained from Kallman’s Ph.D. dissertation “An empirical study of long-range planning in the motor freight industry,” City University of New York, 1976, and from personal 
communication with Kallman. 
7 In a further analysis of the data (unpublished), Grinyer found that those companies that scheduled meetings to discuss strategy tended to have a superior financial performance (personal communication). 
8 I tested for statistical significance using the data in Rue and Fulmer (1973).  In cases showing significant results, the authors had tested significance. 
Table 1. Research on the value of formal planning in various situations 
 
Planning process1                        Situation2  Results3 
   
 
 
 
 
Study Description   
[Time span]4  
 
 Van de Ven (1980) 9 planners versus 5 non-planners in introduction of 
 [1973-1975]  community child care programmes. F F F F F Y        Y ? ? F F 
 Ansoff et al. (1970) Acquisitions by 22 planners versus 40 non 
 [1947-1966]  planners. F F F ? ? ?        (Y) ? ? F* F 
Thune and House (1970) A: Drug, chemical and machinery industries. 
 [1958-1965]   9 planners versus 9 non-planners. F ? ? ? ? ?        (Y) ? ? F*  ? 
  B: Food, oil and steel industries. 
    8 planners versus 10 non-planners. F ? ? ? ? ?        (N) ? ? 0 ? 
 Herold et al. (1972) Drug and chemical industries.-5 planners and 5 matched 
 [1962--1969]  non-planners. (Extension of Thune and House, 1970). F ? ? ? ? (N)      Y ? ? F ? 
 Kudla (1980, 1981)5 78 planners versus 51 non-planners from 
 [1960-1975]  Fortune 500. F ? ? F '?   ?          ?        (N)  ? F ? 
Harju (1981, pp. 112-113) 12 planners with commitment versus 31 lacking either 
 [1976-1979]  formal planning or commitment or both. ? ? ? ? F  ?         ? ? ? F* F 
Karger and Malik (1975) 19 planners versus 19 non-planners among chemical, 
Malik and Karger (1975) drug, electronics and machinery industries. (F)      (F)       (F)      (1) F ?       (Y) ?         ? F* ? 
 [1964-1973] 
Wood and LaForge (1979, 1981)                   Survey of banks, interview plus questionnaire. 
 [1972-1976]  27 planners versus 9 non-planners. (F) ? ?         ? F   (Y)   ? (N) (N) F* ? 
Kallman and Shapiro (1978) 298 firms in motor freight industry. 
 [1965-1974]6  Five levels of planning examined. F ? ?         ? ? Y N N (N) F ? 
Grinyer and Norburn (1975) In-depth interviews with 91 executives from  
 [1966-1970]7  21 companies in the U.K. F ? ?         F ? ? ? ? ? 0 ? 
Leontiades and Tezel (1980) 61.cotnpanies from Fortune 1000 largest. industrial 
 [1971-1977]  firms. ? ? ?         ? ? ? ? ? ? 0 ? 
Fulmer and Rue (1974)8 A: Durable goods: 33 planners versus . 
Rue and Fulmer (1973)  20 non-planners. F ?         ?         F ? ?        ?         ?          ? F ? 
 [early 1970s] B: Non-durable goods: 108 planners versus 
.  43 non-planners. F ?         ?         F ? ?        ?         ?           ? I ? 
  C: Service industries: 27 planners versus  
   40 non-planners. F ?         ?         F ? ?       (N)      ?          (N) I ? 
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